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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Sarah Johnson appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing her successive petition for post-conviction relief.  Johnson raises 
three claims on appeal:  (1) she contends the district court erred in denying her 
request for additional DNA testing under I.C. § 19-4902; (2) she asks the Court to 
overrule Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), contending the 
Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in that case was “manifestly wrong,” “illogical,” 
and “unwise”; and (3) she asserts that the district court erred in dismissing her 
Eighth Amendment claim, which is based on the United States Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
(Docket Nos. 32210 and 33312)1  
 
 The state charged Johnson with, and a jury convicted her of, the first-
degree murders of her parents, Alan and Diane Johnson.  State v. Johnson, 145 
Idaho 970, 972, 188 P.3d 912, 914 (2008).  “The district court sentenced 
Johnson to concurrent life sentences, plus fifteen years under I.C. § 19-2520 for 
a firearm enhancement.”  Id.   
 Johnson raised three issues on direct appeal:  (1) whether the district 
court erred in giving an aiding and abetting instruction to the jury; (2) whether she 
                                                 
1 Both Johnson and the state filed motions for judicial notice, asking the district 
court to take judicial notice of several items related to Johnson’s underlying 
criminal case (Docket No. 33312), and her initial post-conviction case (Docket 
No. 38769).  (R., pp.167-168, 276-313.)  The district court granted the parties’ 
request for judicial notice.  (3/2/2015 Tr., p.4, L.4 – p.5, L.25.) 
 2 
was deprived of her right to a unanimous jury verdict because the district court 
did not require the jury to agree on whether she actually killed her parents or 
whether she aided and abetted their murders; and (3) whether her “constitutional 
rights were violated when the district court failed to remove a certain juror from 
the jury pool or obtain an unequivocal commitment that the juror would follow all 
of the court’s instructions.”  Johnson, 145 Idaho at 972, 188 P.3d at 914.  The 
Idaho Supreme Court denied relief on all of Johnson’s claims and affirmed her 
convictions.  See generally Johnson, supra.      
 
Course Of Initial Post-Conviction Proceedings (Docket No. 38769) 
  
 Johnson filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was 
initially granted, in part, in relation to Johnson’s claim that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file a timely notice of appeal from her judgment of conviction.  
Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 10, 319 P.3d 491, 494 (2014) (“Johnson II”).  As a 
result, the district court re-entered the judgment of conviction, and “Johnson 
immediately filed a timely notice of appeal.”  Id.  The post-conviction proceedings 
were then stayed pending resolution of Johnson’s direct appeal.  Id.   
Following her direct appeal, Johnson filed a Second Amended Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, raising numerous claims.  Johnson II, 156 Idaho at 10, 
319 P.3d at 494.  The allegations in Johnson’s second amended petition included 
that: 
(1) Her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony 
from Robert Kerchusky, the defense’s fingerprint expert; (2) the 
unidentified prints on the murder weapon, its scope, and an insert 
from the box of ammunition were fresh; and (3) newly discovered 
evidence warranted a new trial.  The newly discovered evidence 
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claim was based on the discovery that Christopher Hill’s fingerprints 
matched the previously unidentified prints on the murder weapon, 
its scope, and the ammunition. 
 
Johnson II, 156 Idaho at 10, 319 P.3d at 494. 
 The district court summarily dismissed some of Johnson’s claims, but 
“held an evidentiary hearing on six claims including Johnson’s claims regarding 
counsel’s alleged failure to inquire about the age or ‘freshness’ of the unidentified 
prints and the newly discovered evidence claim.”  Johnson II, 156 Idaho at 10, 
319 P.3d at 494.  Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed 
Johnson’s remaining claims.  Id.   
 On appeal from the denial of relief on her initial post-conviction claims, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that (1) Johnson received effective assistance of 
counsel; and (2) the identification of Hill’s fingerprints did not entitle Johnson to a 
new trial.  Johnson II, 156 Idaho at 10-13, 319 P.3d at 494-497.  The Remittitur 
issued on March 12, 2014.   
 
Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings (Docket No. 42857) 
 On April 9, 2012, while her post-conviction appeal was pending, Johnson, 
with the assistance of pro bono counsel, filed the following documents in the 
original post-conviction case:  (1) a DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief (“Successive Petition”); (2) Motion for Appointment of Counsel; 
(3) Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b); and (4) the 
Affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian in Support of DNA and Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief.  (R., pp.4-98.)  On January 22, 2014, Johnson filed an 
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“Amended 
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Successive Petition”).2  (R., pp.99-158.)  Johnson subsequently withdrew her 
Motion for Relief from Judgment, and the district court ordered Johnson’s 
Successive Petition, Amended Successive Petition, and Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit 
to be filed “in a separate case and assigned a separate case number.”  (R., 
p.160.)                  
 In her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson sought additional DNA 
testing  pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902(b).  (R., pp.104-111.)  Johnson also raised 
several ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  (R., pp.111-134.)  Specifically, 
Johnson alleged:  (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
dismiss based on the state “discarding the comforter” that was on Alan’s and 
Diane’s bed at the time Johnson murdered them (R., pp.111-114); (2) trial 
counsel were ineffective for failing to present evidence of a witness’s “parole 
status” (R., pp.115-118); (3) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to 
prosecutorial misconduct “throughout the trial” (R., pp.118-120); (4) trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to object to allowing the jury to view the location of the 
murders (R., pp.120-122); (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on an 
alleged conflict of interest (R., pp.123-128); (6) ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel for failing to challenge the district court’s denial of Johnson’s motion to 
suppress (R., pp.129-132); and (7) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for 
failing to “argue that the fixed life sentences were both excessive and 
unconstitutional” (R., pp.132-135).  Finally, Johnson alleged a violation of Brady 
                                                 
2 The amended petition was also filed in Johnson’s original post-conviction case.  
(See R., p.99.) 
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v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (R., pp.135-138), and an Eighth Amendment 
violation based on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (R., pp.138-153). 
 Anticipating challenges to her Amended Successive Petition on the 
grounds that it was untimely and an improper successive petition, Johnson 
alleged that she was entitled to pursue a successive petition because, she 
claimed, her original post-conviction attorney was ineffective, and she alleged the 
successive petition was timely because she filed it while her initial post-conviction 
appeal was “still pending.”  (R., pp.156-157.)   
 The state filed a motion for summary dismissal of Johnson’s Amended 
Successive Petition, along with a supporting brief.  (R., pp.170-190.)  The state 
requested dismissal of Johnson’s DNA claim because Johnson failed to establish 
she was entitled to additional DNA testing under the requirements set forth in I.C. 
§ 19-4902(b).  (R., pp.178-184.)  The state requested dismissal of Johnson’s 
remaining claims on two bases.  First, the state asserted that Johnson’s 
Amended Successive Petition should be dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908, 
which precludes successive petitions absent a sufficient reason and, under the 
Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 389 
(2014), the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not 
constitute a sufficient reason.  (R., pp.184-185.)  Second, the state requested 
dismissal of Johnson’s Amended Successive Petition on the basis that it is 
untimely.  (R., pp.16-18.) 
 Johnson filed an “objection” to the state’s motion for summary dismissal, 
arguing that she was entitled to additional DNA testing (R., pp.194-208), and that 
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there was “sufficient reason” to raise her Eighth Amendment claim, and the claim 
was timely, because the Supreme Court opinion on which it was based “was not 
decided until June 25, 2012, six years after [she] filed her original petition for 
post-conviction relief” and “two months before” she filed her successive petition 
(R., p.210), and because she included the claim in her Amended Successive 
Petition while her initial post-conviction appeal was still pending (R., p.211).  With 
respect to her ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Johnson conceded the 
claims were foreclosed by Murphy, and asserted she could raise the claims 
“directly in federal court and bypass the state courts entirely.”  (R., p.209.)  
 The state filed a reply addressing Johnson’s “objections” to its request for 
summary dismissal (R., pp.227-233), after which the district court held a hearing 
on the state’s motion (see generally Tr.).  Following the hearing, the court 
entered a written decision granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal and 
a Judgment dismissing Johnson’s Amended Successive Petition.  (R., pp.236-
254.)  Johnson filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (R., pp.273-274), 
which the district court denied (R., pp.339-343).   








 Johnson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the District Court err in failing to permit DNA testing?  
Specifically, did the Court err in concluding that comparison of 
previously obtained but unidentified DNA against Christopher Hill’s 
DNA and the expanded government databases was not a new 
technology not available at the time of trial?  Further, did the Court 
err in its analysis of whether the result of the requested DNA testing 
has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence 
that would show that it is more probable than not that Sarah is 
innocent?  And did the Court err in concluding that based on the 
trial evidence Sarah cannot ever show that she should be allowed 
DNA testing?  
  
2. Should this Court overrule Murphy, supra, as it is both 
manifestly wrong and an unwise relinquishment of state 
sovereignty?  If so, should Claims 2-5, which were dismissed 
pursuant to Murphy, be remanded to the District Court to determine 
whether sufficient cause exists to allow the claims to be raised in a 
second petition? 
 
3. Did the District Court err in dismissing the Miller claim as it 
was not waived, Miller applies retroactively to Idaho, and Sarah’s 
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller? 
 
(Opening Brief of Appellant (“Appellant’s Brief”), pp.12-13.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Johnson failed to show the district court erred in concluding she failed 
to meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case for additional DNA testing 
under I.C. § 19-4902? 
 
2. Should this Court decline to consider Johnson’s request to overrule 
Murphy, supra, in light of Johnson’s agreement to dismiss the claims barred by 
Murphy and her stated intent to “bypass the state courts entirely” and pursue 
those claims in federal habeas?  Even if Johnson did not waive her challenge to 
Murphy, should this Court decline to address it because the Court can affirm the 
dismissal of Johnson’s Claims Two through Five because the claims were not 




3. Has Johnson failed to show error in the district court’s summary dismissal 
of her Eighth Amendment claim because the claim is barred by I.C. § 19-4901 
and I.C. § 19-4908, is untimely, and otherwise fails to allege a genuine issue of 
material fact entitling Johnson to relief?   
 




Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Determining She 
Failed To Meet Her Burden Of Establishing A Prima Facie Case For Additional 




 Johnson contends the district court erred in denying her request for 
additional DNA testing pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902.  Application of the statutory 
requirements for DNA testing support the district court’s conclusion that Johnson 
failed to present a prima facie case that she is entitled to additional DNA testing 
under I.C. § 19-4902.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“An interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review.”  State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286 P.3d 537, 539 
(2012) (brackets, quotations, and citation omitted).   
 
C. Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Determining 
She Failed To Meet Her Burden Of Establishing A Prima Facie Case For 
Additional DNA Testing Under I.C. § 19-4902 
 
In Claim One of her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson sought relief 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902(b).  (R., pp.104-111.)  The district court properly 
dismissed this claim.   
Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) provides, in relevant part: 
A petitioner may, at any time, file a petition before the trial 
court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for 
the performance of fingerprint or forensic deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial 
which resulted in his or her conviction but which was not subject to 
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the testing that is now requested because the technology for the 
testing was not available at the time of trial.   
 
 Subsection (c) of I.C. § 19-4902 requires the petitioner to present a prima 
facie case that “(1) Identity was an issue in the trial which resulted in his or her 
conviction; and (2) The evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of 
custody sufficient to establish that such evidence has not been substituted, 
tampered with, replaced or altered in any material aspect.”  The court must allow 
the testing only if it determines that:  “(1) The result of the testing has the 
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that 
it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent; and (2) The testing 
method requested would likely produce admissible results under the Idaho rules 
of evidence.”  I.C. § 19-4902(e).   
 In support of Claim One, Johnson submitted two affidavits from Dr. Greg 
Hampikian.  (R., pp.84-91, 217-220.)  Dr. Hampikian averred that new “advanced 
DNA amplification and purification techniques” are now available, and were not 
available at the time of trial, and such techniques may be used to test various 
evidentiary items that were admitted at trial.  (See generally R., pp.84-90.)  Dr. 
Hampikian identified the new “techniques” as including “post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns, and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis.”  
(R., p.86.)  In his second affidavit, Dr. Hampikian further explained the new 
technology, which he alleged was not available until after Johnson’s trial, and 
explained which items could be tested pursuant to this new technology.  (R., 
pp.218-220.)  Specifically, Dr. Hampikian averred:  (1) “Post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy (LCN) DNA analysis are new 
 11 
technology which allows DNA testing on much smaller samples than was 
available at the time of Sarah Johnson’s trial in 2005”; (2) a “new more sensitive 
Globalfiler DNA amplification kit,” made available in 2012, “amplifies 24 regions 
of DNA yielding up to 48 alleles, rather than the 16 DNA regions (up to 32 alleles) 
available in the older Identifier DNA amplification kit”; (3) the new “techniques 
represent new DNA technology that has produced results from samples that had 
been declared ‘untestable’ due to low amounts of DNA, or that produced 
‘inconclusive’ results”; (4) “computational tools called intelligent systems” are now 
available “that can deal with low level DNA results, and produce meaningful 
results that human analysts overlook”; (5) the “new technology will permit DNA 
testing to be done on samples that could not have been tested at the time of the 
trial”.  (R., pp.218-219.)  As for the items to be tested, Dr. Hampikian averred: 
 11. In particular, no conclusions could be reached due to 
insufficient amounts of DNA concerning the bloodstain 24 from the 
robe, the tissue from the lower left side of the robe, the tissue from 
the inside lower back of the robe, the tissue from the inside left 
sleeve of the robe, the stain from Bruno Santos’ pants, the fibers 
imbedded in unknown material, bloodstain B from the rifle, and 
bloodstain G from the rifle.  This evidence may now be tested using 
advanced DNA amplification, purification, and analysis techniques. 
 
 12. Robe samples #24-30 were never analyzed and may 
now be tested using advanced DNA amplification, purification, and 
analysis techniques. 
 
 13. DNA from the unidentified fingerprint on the .264 
round (Item # 14) could not have been tested at the time of trial, but 
may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification, purification, 
and analysis techniques. 
 
 14. DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the 
doorknob set on Diane and Alan Johnson’s bedroom door (Items # 
15-16) could not have been tested at the time of trial, but now may 
be tested using advanced techniques not available at the time of 
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trial and compared to reference samples from the time of trial and 
after and submitted to a CODIS databank.   
 
 15. DNA from the palm prints (Items 20-2 and 20-3) could 
not have been tested at the time of trial, but may now be tested 
using advanced DNA amplification, purification, and analysis 
techniques.  
 
 16. DNA from the print on the empty shell casing (Item 
12-1) could not have been tested at the time of trial, but now may 
be tested using advanced DNA amplification, purification, and 
analysis techniques. 
 
 17. One of the hairs removed from Bruno Santo’s [sic] 
sweater has a small root and could now be analyzed using 
advanced DNA amplification, purification, and analysis techniques. 
 
 18. Low levels of DNA from an unidentified source were 
found on the leather glove from the garbage can.  That DNA can 
now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification, purification 
and analysis techniques. 
 
(R., pp.219-220.) 
 Regarding the statutory requirement that the tests Johnson seeks to have 
performed are based on “technology” that was not available at the time of trial, 
the statute does not define what that means.  DNA testing was obviously 
available at the time of trial and a significant amount of DNA testing was done in 
Johnson’s case and the results of those tests were introduced at trial.  (See 
#32210 Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3088-3209 (DNA testimony by forensic scientist 
Cindy Hall).)  That new “techniques” for DNA testing may be available does not 
mean the technology for DNA testing was unavailable at the time of trial; clearly it 
was.  As recently noted by the Court of Appeals:  “Technology is not unavailable 
at trial merely because technology is now ‘dramatically better.’”  McGiboney v. 
State, ___ Idaho ___, 370 P.3d 747, 751 (Ct. App. 2016).   
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 On appeal, Johnson focuses on whether the availability of Christopher 
Hill’s DNA, and other DNA samples in the state database that did not exist at the 
time of her trial, for comparison purposes is new technology under I.C. § 19-
4902(b).  (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  According to Johnson “DNA profiles now 
available on CODIS and the DNA profile of Christopher Hill, are new 
technologies.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  This argument is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute and defies common sense.   
 Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) provides for DNA “testing,” not DNA 
comparisons to the state database.  Moreover, the ability to compare DNA 
samples existed at Johnson’s trial, and was in fact done in relation to the DNA 
evidence collected in her case.  Thus, the ability to compare samples is not a 
new technology.  The fact that the database may now have more samples to 
compare does not mean the database is a new technology.  Johnson’s argument 
to the contrary is without merit.           
 The next statutory requirement Johnson must satisfy is a prima facie case 
that identity was an issue at trial.  I.C. § 19-4902(c)(1).  The statute provides no 
guidance on what this requirement means and the state is unaware of any 
existing authority interpreting this language.  If identity is an issue whenever a 
defendant denies guilt,3 then identity was at issue in Johnson’s case.  If identity is 
not an issue when there is undisputed evidence that the defendant was present 
at the scene of the crime and there is evidence, including DNA evidence, that the 
                                                 
3 This is presumably not the standard since the statute allows even those who 
plead guilty to seek relief.  I.C. § 19-4902(d) (“A petitioner who pleaded guilty in 
the underlying case may file a petition under subsection (b) of this section.”).  
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defendant committed the crime, then identity was not an issue in Johnson’s case 
and she is foreclosed from obtaining any relief under I.C. § 19-4902(b).  Also 
relevant to the question of whether identity was an issue at trial is the fact that 
the jury was fully aware that, in addition to Johnson’s DNA, there was DNA at the 
crime scene that was unidentified,4 just as it was aware that there were 
fingerprints on the murder weapon that did not belong to Johnson.  Nevertheless, 
the jury convicted Johnson based on the evidence linking her to the murders.  
The identity of the person who contributed the samples that were unidentified at 
trial does not mean that identity was an issue as to Johnson because she was 
clearly identified as an individual whose DNA was found on several incriminating 
pieces of evidence, in addition to all of the other evidence of Johnson’s guilt.               
 Even if Johnson has established the predicate technology requirement of 
subsection (b) and has alleged a prima facie case that identity was an issue at 
trial as required by subsection (c)(1), the district court properly denied Johnson’s 
request for additional testing under subsection (e)(1) because the result of any 
testing does not have the “scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative 
evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that [Johnson] is 
innocent.”  The district court detailed the overwhelming evidence of Johnson’s 
guilt in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Johnson’s first post-
conviction case:   
                                                 
4 For example, the “majority” of the DNA found on the latex glove matched 
Johnson’s, but there was, as Dr. Hampikian notes, “another DNA source in a 
lower concentration present;” however, “it was not a complete profile.”  (#32210 
Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3110, Ls.17-20, p.3112, Ls.5-9; Hampikian Aff, p.7.)  
Johnson’s request to pursue further testing of an item such as this supports the 
conclusion that Claim One should be denied.   
 15 
 The court also does not find it surprising that Johnson’s 
fingerprints were not on the weapon, the scope, or any of the 
ammunition or packaging, given that a leather glove was found in 
her room in the trash can, and the matching glove was wrapped in 
Johnson’s robe ready for trash pickup, along with a latex glove 
containing Johnson’s DNA. 
 
 . . . 
 
 Nothing presented to this court during the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she were not 
the actual shooter, was not complicit as an aider and abettor. 
 
 It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of the 
murders.  There was no forced entry in this case, either to the 
Johnson home or the guesthouse; Johnson’s bedroom contained 
.264 caliber cartridges, a 9mm magazine and a right-handed 
leather glove matching the left one wrapped in Johnson’s robe in 
the garage; both gloves belonged to Diane and were kept in the 
family vehicle; the knives found in the guest bedroom and at the 
foot of the Johnsons’ bed were located where an intruder or 
stranger would have difficulty finding them; Johnson had a key to 
the guesthouse; Johnson was angry with her parents because they 
disapproved of her relationship with Santos; and Johnson gave 
numerous conflicting stories about what she allegedly was doing 
when her parents were shot. 
 
. . .  
 
 This court’s reference to the aiding and abetting theory is not 
to say that this  court is unconvinced of Johnson’s direct culpability 
for the murder of her parents, as argued by the state at trial.  Add to 
the above-noted circumstances the DNA evidence, Johnson’s 
motive for the crimes, her access and her opportunity . . ..  
 
. . .  
 
 . . . The evidence against Ms. Johnson which exists in this 
record is, indeed, “overwhelming.” 
 
(#38769 R., vol. 7, pp.1923-1926 (numbering of paragraphs omitted).)   
 The district court also noted the trial judge’s apt assessment of the 
evidence against Johnson: 
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   [T]o suggest to a reasonable jury such things that somebody 
off of the street could come and find that gun in the guest house, 
find those bullets in the guest house, know when the parents were 
going to be there; find the knives in the kitchen that are hidden, the 
one knife that’s hidden behind the microwave or bread box, 
whatever it was, in the dark, no less; go out past the family dog that 
the evidence was would bark, and the dog didn’t bark.  Take the 
same route that Sarah Johnson told the police she took out of the 
house, past the trash can where the robe is found.  Get her 
bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not awaken or 
bother her.   
 
 Both doors being open, according to her experts, the 
parents’ bedroom door and her bedroom door.  Do all of this in the 
dark and not disturb the parents just defies common sense.  
 
(#37869 R., vol. 7, p.1924 (quoting #33312 Supp. Appeal Transcript, pp.449-
450).)   
 Again quoting the trial judge: 
 The jury heard all of the evidence about the robe.  The jury 
doesn’t have to believe that the crime occurred exactly the way the 
defense theory is that it occurred.  The argument of no blood, no 
guilt; well, the converse of that is if there’s blood, there is guilt.  And 
there’s blood.  There’s blood all over the robe, blood on the socks.   
  
 . . .  There’s not one piece of evidence that excludes the 
defendant from the commission of this crime that I heard.  She’s 
right there.  And her defense – I mean her defense people, Howard 
and Mink, testify – and Iman, I believe, all three – at least two of 
them testified that the doors were open.  The door to the parents’ 
bedroom, which is propped open by the pillows, and the door to 
Sarah Johnson’s room is open. 
  
The match to the leather glove, one leather glove that was taken 
out of the Suburban, that’s something else that this unnamed killer 
would have had to have known, is where the gloves were located, 
the mother’s gloves in the Suburban.  Located those in the dark, as 
well, and brought them into the house to help commit this crime.  
And leave one in Sarah Johnson’s room with two cartridges for the 
.264; unspent, unfired cartridges in Sarah Johnson’s room that part 
of her mother’s body parts were found on; and leave those in Sarah 
Johnson’s room, all while not disturbing Sarah Johnson, it just 
doesn’t make sense to me.   
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 And I don’t think it would make sense to the jury.  One of the 
leather gloves found in her room, the other one found out – 
wrapped up in the trash can inside the pink robe.  That’s what I 
mean by the circumstantial evidence here, and she admits being 
there.  
 
 The evidence is overwhelming. 
 
(#38769 R., pp.1925-1926 (quoting #33312 Supp. Appeal Transcript, pp.450-
451).)   
 With respect to whether the additional DNA testing requested by Johnson 
did not have “the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that 
would show that it is more probable than not that [Johnson] is innocent,” I.C. § 
19-4902(e)(1), consistent with its prior findings and the observations of the trial 
court, the district court explained: 
 At trial, a considerable amount of evidence was presented 
that placed Johnson at the scene and that linked her to the 
murders.  Her stories were inconsistent and conflicted with the 
evidence.  Her DNA was found in a latex glove, found wrapped in 
her blood splattered robe, and discarded in a trash can on the 
property.  She knew where the murder weapon was kept (in the 
guest house safe) and had requested the key a few days earlier.  
See also this court’s opinion in Johnson v. State, CV-2006-0324, 
pp.89-92 (Outlining the “mountain of evidence” against Johnson 
and quoting Judge Wood as stating at trial that the amount of 
evidence against Johnson was “overwhelming.”) 
 
 Evidence was also presented that suggested the possible 
involvement of another party, in the form of unidentified fingerprints 
and unidentified DNA.  The defense argued Johnson’s innocence 
under the theory that a stranger entered the house and murdered 
Johnson’s parents.  The jury considered this evidence and heard 
these arguments and still convicted Johnson of first degree murder. 
 
 Therefore, the possibility of identifying a third party DNA 
source from previously untestable samples will not make it more 
probable than not that Johnson is innocent, just as the post-trial 
discovery that the fingerprints on the murder weapon belonged to 
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Christopher Hill did not entitle Johnson to a new trial.  The jury was 
aware that DNA that did not belong to Johnson was present at the 
scene of the murders, just as they were aware that the fingerprints 
on the rifle were not hers.  Even with that knowledge, the jury 
convicted Johnson, deciding that Johnson either (1) fired the 
murder weapon herself while wearing gloves or (2) aided and 
abetted the actual shooter.  Either theory was sufficient for a 
conviction.  Given the fact that the possibility of a third party 
shooter, as evidenced by the presence of unidentified fingerprints 
and DNA, failed to convince the jury that Johnson was innocent of 
murdering her parents, the slim possibility that a name or face 
might now be given to that shooter adds little to the mix. 
 
(R., pp.245-246.)   
On appeal, Johnson complains that the district court’s analysis required 
her to “prove in advance of the testing what the results will be” and argues that 
“weighing the evidence is not appropriate at this juncture.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.18-19.)  Johnson made this same argument in her Motion to Alter or Amend, 
and the district court correctly rejected it.  (R., pp.256-277, 339-342.)  The plain 
language of I.C. § 19-4902(e) clearly predicates the entitlement to testing, in part, 
“upon a determination that” “[t]he result of the testing has the scientific potential 
to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more 
probable than not that the petitioner is innocent.”  Johnson’s claim that a court 
must ignore the evidence in making this determination is contrary to law.   
Johnson also contends, that even if weighing the evidence is proper, the 
“State’s theory of the case was far-fetched” and any weighing is in her favor.  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.19.)  This argument is contrary to the record and the many 
prior determinations regarding the quality and quantity of evidence supporting 
Johnson’s murder convictions.  Certainly 12 jurors did not find the state’s theory 
far-fetched, nor was the trial court’s conclusion, or the post-conviction court’s 
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conclusion both now and in Johnson’s prior post-conviction case, which the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, that there was substantial evidence of Johnson’s 
guilt erroneous.   
Johnson also continues to disregard what the bulk of the DNA evidence 
showed.  First, most of the 30 stain samples taken from the robe matched Diane 
and others were consistent with Johnson’s profile and Diane and Alan could not 
be excluded as contributors.  (#32210 Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3115-3117, 3439-
3455.)  The fact that there were a few “unknown” stains out of the 30 stains 
tested from the robe pales in comparison to the volume of positively identified 
DNA.  (#32210 Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3446, 3454-3455.)  Also notable is that the 
unknown DNA from the top of the gun barrel did not match the unknown DNA 
from the robe, and the stains on the gun barrel that were positively identified 
matched Alan’s DNA.  (#32210 Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3461-3465.)  This is notable 
for at least two reasons.  First, Johnson’s continued attempt to impugn 
Christopher Hill (or anyone else) seems to rely, in part, on the DNA from the gun 
matching the DNA on the robe, but we already know the samples do not match.  
Second, Johnson’s implication that the murderer deposited blood on the gun 
barrel is entirely speculative.   
The district court correctly concluded Johnson failed to meet her burden of 
showing she is entitled to additional DNA testing under I.C. § 19-4902.  Johnson 




Because Johnson Agreed To The Dismissal Of Her Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel And Brady Claims, This Court Should Decline To Consider Her Request 
To Overrule Murphy And Remand Those Claims For Further Consideration; 
Alternatively, The Court Need Not Reconsider Murphy Because Johnson’s 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel And Brady Claims Were Not Timely Filed; 
Even If The Court Addresses Johnson’s Request To Reconsider Murphy, 
Johnson Has Failed To Articulate Any Valid Basis For Overruling It  
 
A. Introduction 
In her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson raised several ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims and a substantive Brady claim (R., pp.111-138), 
and asserted the claims were timely and could be raised in a successive petition 
due to the alleged ineffective assistance of initial post-conviction counsel (R., 
pp.154-157).  Approximately one month after Johnson filed her Amended 
Successive Petition, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Murphy v. 
State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), in which it held that ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel does not constitute a sufficient reason for 
filing a successive petition.  The state, therefore, sought dismissal of Johnson’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims based on Murphy, and based 
on timeliness.  (R., pp.184-187.)  Johnson thereafter conceded her ineffective 
assistance of counsel and Brady claims were barred by Murphy, and advised that 
she would “bypass the state courts entirely” and “file a Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus raising the ineffective assistance of counsel claims” under Martinez v. 
Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013).  (R., 
p.209.)  The district court, therefore, dismissed the claims based on Johnson’s 
concession that “Idaho case-law precludes her from proceeding” on these claims.  
(R., p.240.) 
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On appeal, Johnson asks this Court to overrule Murphy and remand her 
ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims to the district court to 
“determine whether sufficient reasons exists [sic] to raise them in [a] successive 
petition.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.33, 41.)  This Court should reject Johnson’s 
request for three reasons:  (1) the dismissal of Johnson’s ineffective assistance 
of counsel and Brady claims was invited; (2) regardless of Murphy, Johnson’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims are untimely; and (3) Johnson 
has failed to establish any basis for overruling Murphy.        
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 On appeal from the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court “will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on 
the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and 
will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.”  Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).   
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony are 
matters within the discretion of the trial court.  Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 
702, 274 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). 
 
C. Because Johnson Invited Dismissal Of Her Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel And Brady Claims, This Court Should Decline To Consider 
Johnson’s Request To Overrule Murphy And Have Those Dismissed 
Claims Remanded For Further Proceedings  
 
After the state requested summary dismissal of Johnson’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel and Brady claims based, in part, on the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Murphy, supra, Johnson conceded that Murphy “appears to present a 
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bar to their presentation” and stated she would “file a Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus raising the ineffective assistance of counsel claims” “directly in federal 
court and bypass the state courts entirely.”  (R., p.209 (emphasis added).)  At 
the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Johnson reiterated this 
concession and her intention to proceed to federal court, stating:  “[W]e concede 
that, following the Murphy decision of our Supreme Court, there are certain 
claims that have been obviated.  As Mr. Benjamin has pointed out, that matter 
can be taken up in federal habeas proceedings.”  (10/20/2014 Tr., p.20, Ls.12-
16.)   
As a result of Johnson’s concession, the district court dismissed 
Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims (Claims Two 
through Five), stating:   
Johnson conceded in her Objection to Respondent’s Motion 
for Summary Dismissal that Idaho case-law precludes her from 
proceeding on four of the six claims included in her Successive 
Petition.  At the hearing held on 10/20/14, both parties[5] stipulated 
to the dismissal of these claims.  Therefore, claims two through five 
of Johnson’s Successive Petition are summarily dismissed. 
 
(R., p.5 (footnote citation to Murphy omitted).)   
 Despite her concession and her representation in district court that she 
intended to “bypass the state courts entirely” with respect to her ineffective 
assistance of counsel and Brady claims, Johnson asks this Court to overrule 
Murphy and remand those claims to the district court for further proceedings.  
                                                 
5 At the summary dismissal hearing, counsel for the state noted that Johnson 
indicated in her objection to the state’s motion that, in light of Murphy, she would 
pursue her ineffective assistance of counsel claims in federal habeas.  
(10/20/2014 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-22.) 
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(Appellant’s Brief, pp.33-41.)  This Court should decline to consider Johnson’s 
argument because she invited the dismissal of those claims.  See State v. 
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420, 348 P.3d 1, 35 (2015) (“The invited error doctrine 
precludes a criminal defendant from ‘consciously’ inviting district court action and 
then successfully claiming those actions are erroneous on appeal.”); Row v. 
State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001) (citation omitted) (“The 
longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised 
for the first time on appeal.”).   
Although the state acknowledges that the district court was bound to 
follow this Court’s decision in Murphy, and had no authority to overrule it, if 
Johnson wished to ask this Court to overrule that decision on appeal from the 
denial of her Amended Successive Petition, she was required to preserve the 
issue by asserting her intention to do so – she did not.  In fact, Johnson did the 
opposite by telling the district court that she intended to “bypass the state courts 
entirely” with respect to her ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims, 
and pursue those claims in federal habeas.  (R., p.209.)   
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Because Johnson agreed6 to the dismissal of her ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, this Court should decline her request to reconsider Murphy so  
that those claims can be remanded for further proceedings.   
 
D. This Court Need Not Consider Whether To Reconsider Murphy In Order 
To Affirm The Dismissal Of Johnson’s Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
And Brady Claims Because It Can Affirm On The Alternative Basis That 
The Claims Are Untimely  
 
Even if this Court concludes that Johnson did not waive her challenge to 
Murphy, this Court need not address her request to overrule it because the state 
requested dismissal of Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the 
alternative basis that the claims are untimely.  (R., pp.16-18.)  Because Johnson 
agreed that her claims should be dismissed based on Murphy, the district court 
was not required to address the state’s timeliness argument.  (See R., p.240.)  
However, because Johnson had notice of this ground for dismissal as a result of 
the state’s motion (R., pp.185-187), and she presented an argument in her 
Second Amended Petition as to why she believed the claims were timely filed 
(R., p.157), this Court may affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims on the basis that the claims were not timely filed.  
                                                 
6 Johnson takes issue with the district court’s characterization that she stipulated 
to the dismissal of her ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims.    
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5 n.3 (“Contrary to the District Court’s understanding, 
[Johnson] never stipulated to the dismissal of any of her claims.”).)  Although 
there was no formal stipulation entered with respect to the dismissal of Johnson’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims, a stipulation is nothing more 
than an agreement.  See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stipulation.  
Because the record supports the conclusion that Johnson agreed her ineffective 
assistance of counsel and Brady claims were barred by Murphy and should be 
dismissed, her complaint about the district court’s use of the word “stipulated” is 
purely semantical.   
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See Caldwell v. State, 159 Idaho 233, 358 P.3d 794 (Ct. App. 2015) (“Absent . . . 
notice, we may not affirm on a theory other than that upon which the district court 
based the summary dismissal.”).  
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be 
commenced by filing a petition “any time within one (1) year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later.”  In the 
case of successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has “recognized that rigid 
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering ‘claims 
which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise 
important due process issues.’”  Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 
1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 
870, 874 (2007)).  However, absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitation 
period should be tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief 
is a basis for dismissal of the petition.  Rhoades, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066; 
Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Kriebel v. State, 148 
Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009). 
The relevant inquiry in deciding if Johnson’s successive petition was 
timely filed requires consideration of whether Johnson filed her successive 
petition within a reasonable time of when the claims raised in the petition were 
known or reasonably could have been known.  Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 
174 P.3d at 874.  Claims Two, Three, and Four in Johnson’s Amended 
Successive Petition allege trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for various 
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reasons.  (R., pp.111-135.)  These claims were known, or reasonably could have 
been known, when Johnson filed her original petition or even when she filed the 
second amended petition in her initial post-conviction case.  Rhoades, supra.  
The same is true for Johnson’s fifth claim – that the state allegedly withheld 
exculpatory evidence regarding the identity of Christopher Hill’s fingerprints – 
since this claim was not only known when Johnson filed the second amended 
petition in her initial post-conviction action, those fingerprints were the subject of 
the evidentiary hearing in that case with respect to Johnson’s assertion that she 
was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  That Johnson 
reframed the claim as a Brady violation in her Amended Successive Petition 
does not make the claim timely.      
 Contrary to Johnson’s assertion in her Amended Successive Petition, 
Claims Two through Five are not timely just because she thinks it is “not 
unreasonable in terms of timeliness to file a successive petition even before 
litigation has concluded on the original petition.”  (R., p.59.)  Indeed, this 
argument ignores the applicable standard for assessing timeliness as it says 
nothing about when the claims were known, or reasonably could have been 
known.   
Because Claims Two through Five in Johnson’s Amended Successive 
Petition were not timely filed, this Court should affirm the dismissal of these 
claims based on timeliness without addressing Johnson’s request to overrule 
Murphy.     
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E. To The Extent This Court Considers Johnson’s Request To Overrule 
Murphy, It Should Decline Johnson’s Invitation To Do So Because She 
Has Failed To Show Murphy Was Wrongly Decided 
 
 The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act specifically provides that “[a]ll 
grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application.”  I.C. § 19-4908.  “Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for 
a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted 
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the 
original, supplemental, or amended application.”  Id.   
 In Murphy, the Court held that “because [there is] no statutory or 
constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, [a post-
conviction petitioner] cannot demonstrate ‘sufficient reason’ for filing a 
successive petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel.”  156 
Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371.  Thus, after Murphy, an allegation that post-
conviction counsel was ineffective no longer constitutes a sufficient reason for 
pursuing a successive post-conviction petition.   
 Johnson asks this Court to overrule Murphy, arguing Murphy “is manifestly 
wrong,” “illogical,” and “unwise.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.33-41.)  Although Johnson 
has recited the correct standards for overruling precedent, she has failed to show 
those standards are satisfied in relation to her request to overrule Murphy.  
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 The Court “will ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions unless it is 
shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over 
time to be unwise or unjust.”  State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 
490 (2012) (citations omitted).  Johnson contends Murphy is “manifestly wrong 
because it interprets the statutory phrase ‘sufficient reason’ to require a showing 
of a constitutional violation.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.34.)  This argument reflects a 
misunderstanding of the Court’s holding in Murphy.   
 The Court in Murphy was not purporting to interpret the meaning of the 
words “sufficient reason,” the Court was considering whether an allegation of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel constitutes a sufficient reason 
for purpose of filing a successive petition under I.C. § 19-4908.  That inquiry 
required the Court to analyze whether there is such a thing as “ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel” because something that does not exist 
cannot constitute any reason, much less a sufficient one.  In addressing this 
question, the Court correctly concluded that because there is no constitutional or 
statutory right to post-conviction counsel, a claim that post-conviction counsel 
was ineffective necessarily fails because such a claim is predicated on the 
existence of a right in the first instance.  Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394-395, 327 P.3d 
at 370-371.  Johnson’s focus on whether the legislature “intended the phrase 
‘sufficient reason’ to require the deprivation of a constitutional right” misses the 
point.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.34.)  The Court in Murphy did not need to ascertain 
the legislature’s intent in order to determine that a non-existent reason could not 
be a sufficient reason.   
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 Johnson also argues that Murphy should be overruled because it “is 
unwise because it shifts the duty of adjudicating state cases to the federal court.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.38.)  Johnson elaborates on this argument as follows: 
 The unintended consequence of Murphy is that it has given 
the federal courts the opportunity to decide state ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims as an original 
matter, when under Palmer [v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 
955 (1981),7] the claims would have had to be raised in a 
successive petition and ruled upon by the state courts before they 
could be raised in federal court.  As a matter of state judicial policy, 
state trial courts should be resolving allegations that state trials 
were not fair.  State appellate courts should review those rulings.  
And, the federal courts should only overturn those decision when 
petitioners can overcome the highly deferential standard of federal 
court review applied to exhausted claims.  See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).  
However under Murphy, ineffective assistance claims, which would 
have previously been decided in state court, are now being raised 
in federal court under Martinez.  And, the federal court may review 
these claims de novo because there are no state court findings of 
facts [sic] or conclusions of law for the federal court to defer to. 
  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.39-40 (footnote omitted).)  Johnson’s reasons for claiming 
that Murphy was unwise, while perhaps superficially appealing, do not withstand 
scrutiny. 
 The first premise of Johnson’s “Murphy is unwise” argument is that the 
Court in deciding Murphy was ignorant of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Martinez and, therefore, did not contemplate the “consequences” of its decision.  
There is no basis for this assertion.  The Supreme Court issued Martinez on 
                                                 
7 In Palmer, the Court held that “allegations of ineffective assistance of prior 
postconviction counsel, if true,” would satisfy the “sufficient reason” requirement 
for filing a successive post-conviction petition.  102 Idaho at 596, 635 P.2d at 
960.  Murphy overruled this holding.  156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371 (“[W]e 
overrule Palmer and hold that because Murphy has no statutory or constitutional 
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, she cannot demonstrate 
‘sufficient reason’ for filing a successive petition based on ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel.”).   
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March 20, 2012.  132 S.Ct. 1309.  Murphy was decided nearly two years later, on 
February 25, 2014.  156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365.  Surely the Idaho Supreme 
Court managed to become aware of Martinez at some point during that two-year 
period before issuing Murphy.  Even if it had not, the Court has had several 
opportunities since Murphy to reconsider its decision in light of Martinez and 
remedy whatever consequences it did not intend, if any.  See, e.g.,  Grant v. 
State, 156 Idaho 598, 329 P.3d 380 (Ct. App. 2014), review denied July 31, 
2014; Gerdon v. State, Docket Nos. 40454/40455, 2014 WL 1572544 (Idaho 
App. April 21, 2014), reviewed denied June 20, 2014; Atwell v. State, Docket No. 
39996, 2013 WL 5984363 (Idaho App. May 3, 2013), review denied June 12, 
2013.  That said, whatever consequences flow from Murphy in light of Martinez 
are not necessarily subject to any remedy because to overrule Murphy for that 
reason would require the Idaho Supreme Court to endorse the fiction of an 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claim, which would be contrary 
to Supreme Court precedent, just to avoid the “consequences” of other Supreme 
Court authority, i.e., Martinez.  As the Court has noted in the context of statutory 
interpretation, the Court’s duty is to “follow[ ] the law as written,” it is not to ignore 
the law in favor of other objectives.  Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 
151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011).        
 The second, but related, premise of Johnson’s “Murphy is unwise” 
argument is that Murphy has resulted in a “relinquish[ment] [of] state sovereignty 
by letting the federal courts do the work the state courts have traditionally done 
and allowing the federal courts to hear evidence never presented to the state 
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court and using that evidence to rule on claims never presented to the state 
courts.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.41.)  Aside from her concerns about state 
sovereignty and the ability of Idaho courts to adjudicate ineffective assistance of 
trial and appellate counsel claims before the federal court does, Johnson “has 
not pointed to anything in the record showing that during the last [two] years 
[Murphy] has proved to be [an] unwise” relinquishment of state sovereignty.  
Koivu, 152 Idaho at 519, 272 P.3d at 491.  That a federal court may, pursuant to 
Martinez, decide a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of trial or 
appellate counsel claim without input from the state court does not demonstrate 
that Murphy was “unwise” because Johnson has cited no evidence that the 
federal court has been unable to decide such claims correctly.  In other words, 
Johnson has cited no federal case that has, as a result of Murphy and Martinez, 
resulted in a federal court vacating the conviction of an Idaho defendant based 
on a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Thus, Johnson’s argument boils 
down to an assertion that Idaho state courts, including this Court, should do more 
work just in case there is a point in the future where the deference afforded state 
court judgments on federal habeas review might make a difference.  This “do 
more work for sovereignty” argument falls far short of demonstrating the Court in 
Murphy was unwise for allowing it to happen; indeed, some might argue Murphy 
was wise because it relieved the state courts of the burden of entertaining 
multiple successive petitions based on allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  See Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394, 327 P.3d at 370 (quotations and citation 
omitted) (noting the “logic behind” a rule preventing ineffective assistance of 
 32 
counsel claims from being raised in successive post-conviction petitions is “that if 
counsel for post-conviction proceedings, as well as trial and direct appeal, must 
meet the same standards, then claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the 
immediate prior proceeding may be raised ad infinitum”).   
That the United States Supreme Court has seen fit for “equitable” reasons 
to burden the federal courts with considering ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel claims and procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claims does not mean the Idaho Supreme Court was unwise for 
relieving the state courts of the same burden.  This is especially true considering 
the reality that federal courts have long been able to interfere with a state court’s 
resolution of a claim even before Martinez if the federal court determined that the 
state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 
of,” Supreme Court precedent, or was “based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).  While state sovereignty is important, and deference to 
state court factual findings and decision-making is nice, Johnson has failed to 
show those principles support a determination that it was unwise for the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Murphy to reach the legally correct conclusion that because 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a cognizable claim, it 
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cannot be a sufficient reason for filing a successive post-conviction petition.8    
Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing this Court should 
overrule Murphy.   
 
III. 
Johnson Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Dismissal Of Her Eighth 
Amendment Claim  
 
A. Introduction 
 Claim Six in Johnson’s Amended Successive Petition alleges an Eighth 
Amendment violation based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 
132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).  (R., pp.138-153.)  The state moved for summary 
dismissal of this claim pursuant to the successive petition bar, I.C. § 19-4908, 
and because the claim was not timely filed.  (R., pp.184-187.)  The district court 
dismissed Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b) and 
I.C. § 19-4908, and the district court found that Miller does not apply to Idaho’s 
non-mandatory sentencing scheme for first-degree murder.  (R., pp.248-252.)   
 On appeal, Johnson contends:  (1) she “did not waive her Eighth 
Amendment claim by not raising it in her direct appeal or first post-conviction 
petition” because Miller had not been issued so she “[c]learly” could not raise it in 
either of those proceedings (Appellant’s Brief, pp.41-42); (2) she timely alleged 
                                                 
8 The state notes that Johnson’s argument also fails to account for the fact that 
federal courts can, pursuant to Martinez, review procedurally defaulted ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims if the post-conviction petitioner was 
unrepresented in her initial post-conviction proceeding – a common occurrence 
given that a trial court is not required to appoint post-conviction counsel in Idaho.   
I.C. § 19-4904.  Thus, the sacrifice of sovereignty upon which Johnson relies is 
even more limited than her argument suggests.    
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the Eighth Amendment claim because “the appeal in her first post-conviction 
case was still pending” when she alleged the claim in her Amended Successive 
Petition (Appellant’s Brief, p.42); and (3) “the fact that Miller was not decided until 
after both her original and successive petition had been filed is ‘sufficient reason’ 
to permit her to raise the claim” in a successive petition “under I.C. § 19-4908” 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.43).9  Johnson also argues that the district court erred in 
concluding Miller does not apply to her case.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.44-52.)       
 All of Johnson’s arguments fail.  The district court correctly dismissed this 
claim because, notwithstanding Johnson’s assertions to the contrary, she could 
have raised her Eighth Amendment claim on direct appeal, the claim was 
untimely, there was no sufficient reason to assert the claim in a successive 
petition, and Miller does not apply in Idaho.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court “will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on 
the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and 
will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.”  Kelly, 149 Idaho at 521, 236 P.3d at 1281.     
                                                 
9 In her initial brief, Johnson also argues Miller is retroactive.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.52-66.)  That argument was made prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), in which the Court expressly 
decided that Miller is retroactive.  Consequently, Johnson filed a supplemental 
brief arguing that Montgomery “conclusively proves” the district court erred in 
dismissing her Eighth Amendment claim.  (See generally Supplemental Brief of 
Appellant (“Supplemental Brief”).)  In light of Montgomery, the state will not 
address Johnson’s argument that Montgomery is retroactive, but will address her 
claim that Montgomery “proves” the district court erred.      
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The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found.  State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).  
“The burden of demonstrating that a sentence is cruel and unusual is on the 
person asserting the constitutional violation.”  State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 
686, 991 P.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted).   
 
C. Johnson Has Failed To Demonstrate Any Error In The District Court’s 
Dismissal Of Her Eighth Amendment Claim 
 
 After the jury found Johnson guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, 
and the weapon enhancement, the trial court imposed “concurrent life sentences, 
plus fifteen years under I.C. § 19-2520 for a firearm enhancement.”  Johnson, 
145 Idaho at 972, 188 P.3d at 914.  In Idaho, the penalty for first-degree murder 
in a non-capital case is “a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of 
not less than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the offender shall 
not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good 
conduct, except for meritorious service.”  I.C. § 18-4004.   
Johnson did not raise an Eighth Amendment claim, or any other challenge 
to her sentence, on direct appeal.  Johnson, 145 Idaho at 972, 188 P.3d at 914 
(identifying issues).  Nor did Johnson raise an Eighth Amendment sentencing 
claim in her initial post-conviction case (#38769 R., Vol. 3, pp.801-825), or in her 
initial successive post-conviction petition (R., pp.4-46.)  The first time Johnson 
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raised an Eighth Amendment claim was in her Successive Amended Petition, 
filed January 22, 2014.  (R., pp.99, 137-153.)  With respect to that claim, 
Johnson alleged:  “In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller 
that statutory schemes mandating life imprisonment without parole for those 
under age 18 at the time of the offense violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.”  (R., p.142.)  The district court correctly 
dismissed this claim pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b) and I.C. § 19-4908, and 
because Miller does not apply since Idaho does not have a “mandatory fixed life 
sentencing scheme.”  (R., pp.250-252.)  Johnson’s challenges to each of these 
grounds for dismissal fail.     
 
1. Johnson’s Eighth Amendment Claim Is Barred By I.C. § 19-4901(b) 
  Because Johnson Could Have Raised The Claim On Direct Appeal 
 
 The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
“is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings 
in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction.”  I.C. § 19-
4901(b); accord Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997) 
(“An application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal.”).  
Thus, any “issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is 
forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings” except upon 
a “substantial factual showing” by admissible evidence “that the asserted basis 
for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and 
could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.”  I.C. § 
19-4901(b) (emphasis added).  A challenge to a defendant’s sentence, whether 
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based on state law sentencing objectives or the Eighth Amendment, is a claim 
that Johnson could have raised on direct appeal.10  See, e.g., State v. Adamcik, 
152 Idaho 445, 485, 272 P.3d 417, 457 (2012) (raising cruel and unusual 
punishment claim under the Idaho Constitution)11; State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 
576, 597-598, 261 P.3d 853, 874-875 (2011); State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 
392-394, 825 P.2d 482, 489-491 (1992); State v. Shanahan, 133 Idaho 896, 899-
900, 994 P.2d 1059, 1062-1063 (Ct. App. 2000); Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 991 
P.2d 870.  The district court correctly concluded as much.  (R., pp.248-249.) 
Johnson contends the district court erred in its determination that she 
could have raised her Eighth Amendment claim on direct appeal because, she 
argues, the “claim is based upon the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller[, supra], 
which was not decided until June 25, 2012,” which was “four years after the 
opinion in her direct appeal was issued.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.41-42.)  However, 
the date the Supreme Court issued Miller is irrelevant not only because Miller 
does not apply in Idaho for reasons explained infra, but also because Johnson 
did not need existing authority from the United States Supreme Court in order to 
advance an Eighth Amendment argument.  Compare Draper, 151 Idaho at 597-
598, 261 P.3d at 874-875 (asserting Eighth Amendment claim based on juvenile 
status prior to Miller).  If that were a requirement, Miller could never have brought 
                                                 
10 The exception in I.C. § 19-4901(b) does not apply because Johnson’s Eighth 
Amendment claim does not “raise[ ] a substantial doubt about the reliability of the 
finding of guilt.”   
 
11 Appellate counsel in Adamcik is the same attorney who represented Johnson 
in her successive post-conviction proceedings and who is representing Johnson 
on appeal.  Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 452, 272 P.3d at 425. 
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a successful claim.  Johnson’s argument that she could not have presented her 
Eighth Amendment claim before Miller is without merit.  See United States v. 
Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2004) (counsel’s failure to anticipate 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 
(2002), was not ineffective); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir. 
2002) (quoting United States v. Gonzales-Lerma, 71 F.3d 1537, 1542 (9th Cir. 
1995) (“we have rejected ineffective assistance claims where a defendant faults 
his former counsel not for failing to find existing law, but for failing to predict 
future law and have warned ‘that clairvoyance is not a required attribute of 
effective representation’”).  The fact that one of the claims in Johnson’s original 
successive petition, which was filed prior to Miller, is that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise an Eighth Amendment claim is consistent with this 
position.  (R., pp.37-39.)  
Johnson has failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion that her 
Eighth Amendment claim was subject to dismissal under I.C. § 19-4901(b).  
  
2. Johnson’s Eighth Amendment Claim Is Barred By I.C. § 19-4908  
Because She Did Not Provide A Sufficient Reason To Overcome  
The Successive Petition Bar And The Claim Was Not Timely Filed 
 
As noted, a post-conviction “petitioner must generally raise all claims for 
post conviction-relief in his original petition” unless “there is ‘sufficient reason’ 
that the claim ‘was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original 
[petition].’”  Johnson v. State, 158 Idaho 852, 854, 353 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Ct. App. 
2015) (quoting I.C. § 19-4908, brackets original).  The point of the sufficient 
reason “exemption is designed to permit petitioners to surpass the statutory 
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limitation of one petition for post-conviction relief to assert a claim that could not 
have been made in the original petition.”  Johnson, 158 Idaho at 857, 353 P.3d at 
1091 (citations omitted).  For the reasons already stated in subsection III.C.1, 
supra, Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim is one that could have been raised in 
her original petition.  Johnson argues otherwise, asserting, inter alia, that Miller 
was a necessary prerequisite to her Eighth Amendment claim because, she 
contends, “Miller created a substantive change in Eighth Amendment law, 
especially as the cruel and unusual punishment clause has been interpreted in 
Idaho.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.43.)  Johnson cites State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 
253 P.3d 310 (2011), as an “example” of this supposed change to Idaho’s 
interpretation of the “cruel and unusual punishment clause.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.43.)  This argument is without merit.   
The Court in Windom did not, as Johnson claims, interpret the “cruel and 
unusual punishment clause.”  In fact, Windom did not raise an Eighth 
Amendment claim.  Windom instead claimed his sentence was an abuse of 
discretion and an “improper judicial hedge against uncertainty.”12  150 Idaho 873, 
876, 253 P.3d 310, 313.  In affirming Windom’s fixed life sentence, the Idaho 
Supreme Court adhered to its prior state law requirement that a fixed life 
                                                 
12 Although the dissent in Windom discussed Eighth Amendment principles, 
Windom’s claim was not premised on the Eighth Amendment, nor did the 
majority evaluate any unraised Eighth Amendment claim.  150 Idaho at 880 n.2, 
253 P.3d at 317 n.2 (noting dissent’s reliance on Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 
2011 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), “in support of the 
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion,” but declining to “confuse 
[its] well-established standard of review of a trial court’s sentencing decision by 
selective application of statements found in decisions defining the scope of 
Eighth Amendment protections”).   
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sentence “requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator cold never be 
safely released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that 
the individual spend the rest of his life behind bars.”  Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 
253 P.3d at 313.  That the Idaho Supreme Court has its own standards for 
imposing a fixed life sentence in addition to the standards under the Eighth 
Amendment, or the Idaho Constitution, does not mean that the Court has 
authorized the ability to impose fixed life without consideration of a defendant’s 
age.  To the contrary, consistent with the rationale of Miller, Idaho’s appellate 
courts have repeatedly recognized that age is a mitigating factor that should be 
considered by a sentencing court.  See, e.g., State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 620, 
710 P.2d 526, 530 (1985) (“The age of a defendant is likewise a legitimate 
consideration in the evaluative process as a mitigating factor.”); State v. 
Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 388, 716 P.2d 1152, 1160 (1985) (discussing 
defendant’s young age as an important factor in sentencing); State v. Moore, 127 
Idaho 780, 785, 906 P.2d 150, 155 (Ct. App. 1995) (“when a juvenile is 
sentenced as an adult, a juvenile defendant’s age is one of the many 
circumstances that a sentencing court may and should consider in fashioning an 
appropriate sentence”).  Johnson’s claim that “Windom was overruled in part by 
Miller” is without merit.13  (Appellant’s Brief, p.43.)        
                                                 
13 Johnson repeats this argument in her Supplemental Brief, but further contends 
that Miller also overruled Adamcik, supra, and Draper, supra, in which the Court 
relied on language from Windom.  (Supplemental Brief, p.4.)  The argument fails 
in relation to Adamcik and Draper for the same reason it fails in relation to 
Windom.  To the extent Johnson believes the argument was reinforced as a 
result of Montgomery, for the reasons set forth, infra, Montgomery does not 
change the inapplicability of Miller in Idaho.     
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In addition, Johnson did not allege a sufficient reason for not raising her 
Eighth Amendment claim until she filed her Amended Successive Petition on 
January 22, 2014 (as opposed to presenting the claim in her initial post-
conviction case or even in her initial successive petition), which was 18 months 
after Miller was decided on June 25, 2012.  “A court considering whether there is 
sufficient reason for filing the claim in a successive petition must consider 
whether the claim was asserted within a reasonable time.”  Johnson, 158 Idaho 
at 854, 353 P.3d at 1088 (citing Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875). 
Johnson argues her Eighth Amendment claim is timely because she filed her 
Amended Successive Petition “while the appeal in her first post-conviction case 
was still pending.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.42.)  Johnson relies on Hernandez v. 
State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999), for the proposition that a 
successive petition is timely as long as it is “filed one year after the decision on 
the appeal from the original petition.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.42-43.)  Johnson’s 
reliance on Hernandez is misplaced.   
 In Hernandez, the court reiterated the rule that the provision in I.C. § 19-
4902(a) that allows for the filing of a post-conviction petition “within one (1) year 
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal 
or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal” “does not 
encompass a separately filed proceeding under the UPCPA.”  133 Idaho at 797, 
992 P.2d at 792 (citing Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct. 
App. 1992)).  While  the court found Hernandez’s successive petition timely even 
though it was filed more than one year after the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
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the dismissal of Hernandez’ original petition, the court did so on the theory that it 
“relate[d] back to the date of filing of the first application.”  Hernandez, 133 Idaho 
at 798, 992 P.2d at 793.  Johnson fails to acknowledge the basis for the court’s 
decision much less explain why her successive petition should be timely based 
on a relation back theory.  Nor could Johnson make such a showing given that 
the relation back principle applied in Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 798, 992 P.2d at 
793, was based on Palmer, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 995, which was overruled 
by Murphy, supra.  Indeed, any attempt by Johnson to relate her Eighth 
Amendment claim back to the filing of her original petition would be contrary to 
her contention that it is the proper subject of a successive petition because the 
case upon which she relies did not exist when she filed her first petition.          
 The proper analysis for deciding whether Johnson’s Eighth Amendment 
Claim is timely requires a showing, by Johnson, that the general one-year 
limitation period for post-conviction petitions should be tolled. Rhoades v. State, 
148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009).  Johnson has not and cannot 
satisfy that standard because the ability to bypass the limitation period is 
premised on a recognition that ”rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude 
courts from considering ‘claims which simply are not known to the defendant 
within the time limit, yet raise important due process issues.’” Rhoades, 148 
Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069 (quoting Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 
P.3d at 874).  As noted, Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim is one that could 
have been raised in her original petition even without the benefit of Miller.  Also, 
just as Johnson asserted in her initial successive petition that her appellate 
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counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an Eighth Amendment claim on direct 
appeal and, in doing so, noted that Miller was pending before the United States 
Supreme Court (R., p.39), she could have also raised a substantive Eighth 
Amendment claim at that time, but did not do so.  Instead, Johnson waited 18 
months after Miller was decided to raise a substantive Eighth Amendment claim.  
This was not reasonable.     
To endorse the standard advocated by Johnson – that a successive 
petition is timely if it is filed within one year of the appellate court’s decision on 
the initial petition - would allow petitioners the ability, in some instances, to wait 
years before asserting their claims regardless of whether they have knowledge of 
them just because they have another action pending.  Not even capital 
defendants have that luxury and the state fails to see any reason why Johnson 
should.  Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) (“[W]e 
hold that a reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known 
of the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were extraordinary 
circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that time 
period. In that event, it still must be filed within a reasonable time after the claim 
was known or knowable.”).   
Johnson filed her Amended Successive Petition on January 22, 2014; the 
purpose of the amendment was to include a substantive Eighth Amendment 
claim.  The Supreme Court decided Miller, on which Johnson’s Eighth 
Amendment claim is based, on June 25, 2012.  Eighteen months is not a 
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reasonable time by any standard, including the one-year limitation period set 
forth in I.C. § 19-4902(a), nor did the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller constitute 
a sufficient reason for pursuing a successive post-conviction petition.  Johnson’s 
claims to the contrary fail, and Johnson has failed to show error in the district 
court’s summary conclusion that Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim was subject 
to dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908.  
 
3. The District Court Correctly Concluded That, Regardless Of The 
Procedural Bars To Johnson’s Eighth Amendment Claim, Because 
Miller Does Not Apply In Idaho, Johnson Is Not Entitled to Relief On 
Her Eighth Amendment Claim 
 
In Claim Six of her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson alleged her 
fixed life sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  (R., p.138.)  Johnson’s claim was based on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Miller, in which the Supreme Court held that a statutory 
scheme that requires imposition of a mandatory fixed life sentence for juvenile 
murderers, without the possibility of parole, violates the Eighth Amendment 
because it “runs afoul” of the Court’s cases that require “individualized 
sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties.”  132 S.Ct. at 2460.  
The district court sentenced Johnson to two fixed life terms for first-degree 
murder as authorized by I.C. § 18-4004.  Idaho Code § 18-4004 requires a “life 
sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years”; 
it does not require a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole.  
Thus, the statute under which the court sentenced Johnson does not “run[ ] 
 45 
afoul” of the Eighth Amendment.  The district court was correct in reaching this 
conclusion.  (R., p.251.14)  
In her Supplemental Brief, Johnson argues that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Montgomery “conclusively proves the District Court was wrong” in 
dismissing her Eighth Amendment claim.  (Supplemental Brief, p.1.)  Johnson is 
incorrect.   
The holding of Miller is “that mandatory life without parole for those under 
the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”  132 S.Ct. at 2460 (emphasis 
added).  That statutory schemes that required mandatory life sentences for 
juvenile offenders was what “runs afoul” of the Eighth Amendment was the 
Court’s concern in Miller is readily apparent not only from the facts of Miller, but 
from the Court’s repeated reference to the mandatory sentencing scheme at 
issue.  The opinion began with the Court noting: 
The two 14-year-old offenders in these cases were convicted 
of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole.  In neither case did the sentencing authority have any 
discretion to impose a different punishment.  State law mandated 
that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have 
thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with 
the nature of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life 
with the possibility of parole), more appropriate.  Such a scheme 
prevents those meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s 
lessened culpability and greater capacity for change, and runs afoul 
of our cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for 
defendants facing the most serious penalties.  We therefore hold 
that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at 
                                                 
14 The district court also noted that “Miller ha[d] not been found to be retroactive” 
(R., p.251); the Supreme Court has since held that it is.  Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. 
718 (2016).   
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the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishments.  
 
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (bold added, italics original; quotations and citations 
omitted).  In discussing the rationale for its holding, the Court referenced its 
concern with “mandatory” sentences no less than five times.  132 S.Ct. at 2466 
(“But the mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer from 
taking account of these central considerations.”); 132 S.Ct. at 2468 (“To recap:  
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his 
chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, 
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”); id. (“And finally, 
this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when 
the circumstances most suggest it.”); 132 S.Ct. at 2469 (“We therefore hold that 
the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison 
without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”); 132 S.Ct. at 2471 (“Our 
decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of 
crime . . ..  Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—
considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a 
particular penalty.”).  And, importantly, the Court emphasized that its decision did 
not “categorically bar” a fixed life sentence for a juvenile; it only mandates that a 
sentencing body have the opportunity to consider the “offender’s youth and 
attendant characteristics.”  132 S.Ct. at 2471.  This point was reiterated in the 
Court’s concluding paragraph: 
. . . [O]ur individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a 
judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for 
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juveniles.  By requiring that all children convicted of homicide 
receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, 
regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the 
nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before 
us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 
 
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2475. 
 Johnson cannot escape the conclusion that Miller’s ban on statutorily 
mandated fixed life sentences does not apply in her case.  Montgomery does not 
change this fact.   
 The issue in Montgomery was whether the holding of Miller “is retroactive 
to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller 
was decided.”  136 S.Ct. at 725.  The Court held that it is.  Id. at 732-736.  While 
the Supreme Court could, and did, make the holding in Miller in retroactive, it did 
not, and could not, retroactively change the holding of Miller.  Johnson argues 
otherwise, citing the Court’s reasoning for finding the rule in Miller was 
substantive as evidence that Miller holds more than what it said.  Specifically, 
Johnson notes the language in Montgomery where the Court stated, in relevant 
part:  “Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is 
excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable 
corruption, it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for a class of 
defendants because of their status – that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes 
reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5 (quoting 
Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 734).)  Johnson extrapolates from this that, regardless 
of whether the juvenile offender received a statutorily mandated fixed life 
sentence, a fixed life sentence is unconstitutional if the defendant’s crime 
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“reflect[ed] the transient immaturity of youth.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-6.)  This is 
incorrect.  When read in context, the quoted language from Montgomery, made 
in the context of deciding Miller created a substantive rule, did not expand the 
holding of Miller, it merely articulated the rationale of Miller.  Indeed, the very 
page the Court in Montgomery cited from Miller, also includes the following:  “By 
making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that 
harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of 
disproportionate punishment.  Because that holding is sufficient to decide these 
cases, we do not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the 
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, 
or at least for those 14 and younger.”  132 S.Ct. at 2469.  It cannot rationally be 
argued that the Court’s retroactivity discussion in Montgomery expanded the rule 
in Miller to include something the Court in Miller expressly did not consider.15  
Johnson’s claim to the contrary fails.   
In the event this Court concludes that Miller applies to Johnson’s non-
mandatory fixed life sentence, the requirements of Miller were satisfied because 
the trial court could, and did, consider Johnson’s age in imposing sentence and 
had discretion to impose less than a fixed life sentence.  Indeed, if that were not 
true, there would have been no need for the lengthy sentencing hearing, with 
expert testimony, which, as the district court noted, focused on Johnson’s 
                                                 
15 The state also notes that Montgomery, like the defendants in Miller, was 
sentenced to fixed life because the “sentence was automatic upon the jury’s 
verdict, so Montgomery had no opportunity to present mitigation evidence to 
justify a less severe sentence.”  Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 726.  Thus, not even 
the facts of Montgomery support a claim that Miller held more than it did.     
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adolescence.  (R., pp.251-252.)   Nor would the court need to have bothered 
spending 44 pages of transcript explaining the reasons for its sentence, including 
its consideration of Johnson’s age and her capacity for change.  (#32210 Tr., Vol. 
IX, pp.6457-6501.)  While the district court did not make an express finding that 
Johnson’s crimes were not merely the product of “the transient immaturity of 
youth,” that finding is implicit in the comments it did make.  (Id.)  Johnson’s 
claims to the contrary are without merit.  (Supplemental Brief, pp.10-12.)   
Johnson has failed to show any error in the district court’s determination 
that Miller does not apply to Idaho’s non-mandatory sentencing scheme.  Even if 
Miller does apply, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing her fixed life 
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the Judgment dismissing 
Johnson’s Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
 DATED this 17th day of June 2016. 
 
      __/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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